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Cert to CA 3 (en bane) -
(Seitz, C.Jo, van75usenv Al.disert, 
Rosenn, Weis, Garth; Gibbons---
concurring; Hunter-- concurring & 
dissenting) 
Federal/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARYo The issue in this case is whether the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination may be invoked 
by a taxpayer to prevent the production of income tax workpapers 
prepared by his accountant where the documents are in his attorney's 
possessiono An apparently conflicting decision of the CA 8 -in United States Vo Kamisar, Noo 74-611 is on this Conference List 
- and is discussed in a separate memorandumo 
2o FACTSo The taxpayers learned that their tax liability 





of the IRS called in July, 1971 to arrange an appointmento They 
retained an attorney, petr Fisher, who called Feldman to advise 
him that petr Goldsmith would not appear for the appointmento 
In early August (Goldsmith could not remember the exact date. 
but estimated it to be the 4th or 5th of August), the taxpayers 
obtained from the accountant certain records consisting primarily 
of ttanalyses of receipts and disbursements," which were essentially 
lists of income and expenses compiled by the accountant from 
cancelled checks and deposit receipts 0 On October 22? 1971i 
Feldman served a summons on the accountant, who reported that 
he no longer had the docume.ntso On December 1, 1971, the summons 
- at issue here was served on Fishero When Fisher refused to 
comply, the government sought enforcemento The USDC found that 
the summons was issued in good faith, and that the records in 
-
----~ 
question were owned by the accountanto It ordered production. - Inaffirmingp the CA 3 held that petrs had no Fifth 
Amendment right against enforcement of the summons 0 It rejected - ~ ----- - ------ ----
the reasoning of the USDC that lack of ownership defeated the 
Fifth Amendment claim. Its own ~e.asoning, though difficult to 
summarize, apparently relied on three factors: firsti petrs' 
actual possession of the documents was not "extended" but only 
ttfleeting and transitoryo" Second, their possession was for tlE 
"limited purpose" of turning them over to the attorne.y 0 Third, 
the docume.nts were not pre.pared for nsome personal, private 





attorney onlyo" Thus petrs enjoyed no constructive possession 
of the documents, and enforcement of the summons involved no 
personal compulsiono 
Judge Hunter concurred with the part of the opinion 
holding that enforcement would not contravene Donaldson Vo 
Uni~ed States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971) 9 but dissented from the rest 
of the decision 0 He argued that the brevity of petrs' possession 
was irrelevant under Couch Vo United States, 409 UoSo 322 
(1973) 0 What mattered was whether possession had been "rightfulo" 
If possession had been in fact "rightfulgu petrs' Fifth 
Amendment claim was not defeated by their temporary relinquishment · 
- of physical possession for the limited purpose of securing 
-
legal advice with respect to a pending tax investigationo Judge 
Hunter thus would have remanded to the USDC for additional 
findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether possession 
had been "ri~htfulort 
3o CO~lTENTIONSo Petrs argue that their possession of ----
the documents was not in fact ttfleeti.ng or transitoryo" Actual 
possession lasted for two weekso The government conceded that 
----
petrs could have validly claimed a Fifth Amendment right against 
enforcement if they had retained the documentso Therefore 9 
the only question hereg according to petrs, is whether that right 
was lost when they transferred the documents to their a .. torney 0 
If the attorney-client relationship has any meaning, petrs --------------- ...._ - - ~ - ------. -
contend, clients must be deemed to have constructive possession -





sentation and adviceo This case is distinguishable from 
Couch on the grounds that there was a reasonable expectation of 
privacy here arising out of the attorney-client relationshipo 
There is no policy justification for the CA 3's holding, and 
there is a con£lict between this decision and that of the CA 8 
in United States Vo Kamisar, Noo 74-6110 
Resp contends that the decision below was correct, s:ince 
the summoned workpapers were not the private papers of the tax-
payers 9 but rather originated with and belonged to the 
-"'"'-"'" 
accountanto If anyone remained in constructive possession it 
was the accountanto Resp does not oppose granting certv 
- however, in light of the square conflict between this case and 
Kamisaro 
-
4o DISCUSSION. In view of the conflict between this case 
and Kamisar 9 and the importance of the issue to tax investigations, 
one of them would appear to be a granto The issue was 
left open in Couch, where the Court noted that "situations 
may arise where constructive possession is so clear or the re-
linquishment of possession is so temporary and insignificant 
as to leave the personal compulsions upon the accused [resulting 
from enforcement] substantially intacto" 409 U.So, at 333 0 
Apart from the question of whether the CA 3 1 s result is correct, 
its reasoning would appear to have some weaknesses: neither 
the length of time nor the purpose of the period of actual 
possession would seem relevant, much less dispositive, under 







Couch if petrs' possession was rightfulo The transfer of the 
documents to petrs' attorney did not serve any purpose of con-
cealment because the claim against enforc~~ent would have been 
equally strong (indeed, stronger) if petrs had retained themo 
The presence here of some question as to rightfulness 
of possession may not be a signficant disadvantage if the case 
may be remanded for a determination of this issue in accordance 
with Judge Hunter's approacho Nonetheless, the Court may wish 
to consider the Fifth Amendment claim in Kamisar, where the 
accountant formally acknowledged relinquishment of possessiono 
Kamisar 9 of course 0 also presents a standing question, which 
need not be reached if the Court grants cert in Fisher and 
holds kamisaro While there is conflict on the standing issue, 
compare United States Vo Judson 9 322 F.2d 460, 463-65 (CA 9 
1963); Colton Vo United States_, 306 Fo2d 633 9 639 (CA 2) 0 
cert denied, 371 U.So 951 (1963), with Bouschor Vo United 
States 9 316 Fo2d 451, 458-59 (CA 8 1963)f 
and resp in Kamisar is incorrect in the contention that Bouschor 
has no continuing force 0 compare United States Vo Merrell, 303 
FoSuPPo 490, 493 (NoDo NoY. 1969) with ~nited States Vo 
Riland, 364 F~Suppo 120, 121 (SoDo N.Y. 1973) 9 the need for 
resolving this question may not be as great as petr contends, 
since Bouschor has not been followed by other courts of appcals 0 
There is a responseo 
1/14/75 Blumenthal CA opn in petn 
-
Court 
CA • 3 
~~£.. -Voted on ......... ... .. .. .. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned ......... .. ... . . . . , 19 . . . 
Submitted ................ , 19 . . . Announced ................ , 19 .. . 
SOLOMON FISHER, ET AL., Petitioners 
vs. 
UNITED STATES, ET AL. 
7/26/74 Cert. filed. 
\ - ';1..~. I~ 
No. 74-18 
• ~ ~ 
~-, tf-{p l l 
HOLD JURISDICTIONAL O O I NOT 
FOR CERT. STATEMENT MERITS M TI N AB- VOT-
SENT 
G D N POST DIS AFF REV AFF G D ING 
Rehnquist, J ...... . ...... , .... . 
Powell, J ................ , .... . 
Blackmun, J ............. , .... . 
Marshall, J .............. , .... . 
White, J ................. , .... . 
- Stewart, J ............... , ... . . Brennan, J ...... ... ...... , .... . 
Douglas, J ............. ... , .... . 







July 23: 1975 
No. 74-18, Fisher and Goldsmith v. United States (CA3) 
No. 74-611, United States v. Kasmir and Candy 
The purpose of this memo, dictated during the summer, 
is to aid my memory as to the issues presented, and to record 
my quite tentative reaction after a preliminary reading of the 
opinions and briefs. 
* * * * * * 
These cases, consolidated for argument, present the 
identical question whether a taxpayer may invoke the Fifth 
Amendment with respect to his accountant's workpapers where, 
after an IRS investigation has commenced, the accountant 
delivered the workpapers to the taxpayer. 
Case No. 74-612 presents a further question, which we 
do not reach if the Court decides for the government on the 
issue stated above. In No. 74-611 the taxpayer, after obtaining 
the workpapers from his accountant , delivered them to his attorney. 
When served with process, the attorney attempted to invoke his 
client's privilege . CAS held that he was entitled to do so. 





Nos. 74-18 and 74-611 2. 
appendix and briefs in No. 74-18. The Solicitor General's 
brief addresses both cases, and therefore discusses the privi-
lege asserted by the attorney as well as the principal issue. 
CA5 and CA3 reached opposite results .on the right of a taxpayer 
to claim the Fifth Amendment privilege by virtue of taking 
possession of his accountant's records. 
I will comment on this issue in light of the facts 
as found by the district court in Fisher v. United States (74-18). 
Facts in 74-18 
The taxpayers were the Goldsmiths, the accountant was 
Berson, and the lawyer who had possession of the records was 
Fisher. 
In late July 1971, an IRS agent made an appointment , 
with Goldsmith to discuss his tax liability for 1969-70. On 
August 3rd, Goldsmith retained Fisher as counsel, who advised 
Goldsmith not to keep his appointment with the agent. On August 4, 
Goldsmith obtained certain records and papers from his accountant. 
As the nature and ownership of these records is important, I turn 
to the opinion of the DC who found in substance as follows: the 
•) accountant, who had prepared the Goldsmith tax returns for a num-





Nos. 74-18 and 74-611 3. 
and ran trial balances to determine profits. With respect to 
Mr. Goldsmith,the accountant would "take a summary of his 
receipts and disbursements to obtain the income and expenses" 
of the taxpayer. A complete ledger was maintained by the 
accountant for Mrs. Goldsmith. 
The facts as to these records were amplified in the 
SG's brief: 
these records ••• included lists of 
income and expenses compiled by the 
accountant from canceled checks and 
deposit receipts supplied by the 
Goldsmiths. They did not, however, 
include the checks and deposit records 
themselves. 
Although apparently the accountant and the taxpayers 
asserted that these records belonged to the taxpayers (see 
petitioner's brief p. 9), the district court expressly held that 
he was not bound by this testimony of the taxpayer and the ac-
countant. The district court, viewing all of the facts, found 
that "the workpapers were the property of the accountant." 
Petitioners do not rest their case, however, on the 
issue of ownership. They argue• that the records "concern solely -
the personal financial affairs of the taxpayerst' and point out 
-------,~.,,._. ~ ;Sift::.... :.ws ,,,,-,,~ 
that it was the practice of the accountant to give these summaries 






Nos. 74-18 and 74-611 4. 
Position of the SG 
The SG argues that "only personal records" in pos-
session of a taxpayer are protected by the Fifth Amendment. 
In Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, where a member of a 
dissolved partnership held partnership records in his possession, 
the Court held that the records were "partnership records" and 
that the former partner was holding them in a representative 
rather than in a private capacity. The SG relies on this case, 
and on the general position that the Fifth Amendment protects 
only records that are personal to the individual and in his 
custody. As the SG notes: 
if the privilege could become available 
by means of such a simple expedient [the 
transfer by the accountant of his records 
to the taxpayer], the distinction developed 
by the Court between the third party records 
and private papers would be rendered meaning-
less. 
Position of Petitioners 
Petitioners make at least two arguments, as I under-
stand their brief. They contest, essentially, the holding of 
the DC that the records were the property of the accountant. 
The argument is not so much one of technical title and it is of 





Nos. 74-18 and 74-611 s. 
of the taxpayers' personal records (e.g., listing of checks 
and deposit receipts from the taxpayers' books), and that 
therefore they were the equivalent of personal records. 
Petitioners also note that they retrieved these 
records from the accountant "seven weeks" before the summons 
was served on the accountant, and cite cases (including Couch) 
to the effect that the rights of a taxpayer in an enforcement 
case become fixed when the summons is served. 
Petitioners somewhat broader position is that the 
government cannot compel a citizen to produce private papers 
which may incriminate him. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 
616. They emphasize that these records were not held in any 
representative capacity, and that they concerned the taxpayers' 
private financial affairs and were derived solely from the 
records made available to the accountant. 
Our Decision in Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 
As I wrote Couch, and as both parties rely on it in this 
case, I must have it in mind. In that case the accountant was in 
possession of bank statements, payroll records and reports of 
sales and expenditures of the taxpayer. These records had been 
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their income tax returns. The accountant was an independent 
contractor, not an employee. It was conceded that these busi= 
ness records were ~wned by the taxpayer. In distinguishing 
Boyd, the Court emphasi,zed that "the privilege is an intimate 
and personal one"; and that "extortion of information from the 
accused himself" offends the Fifth Amendment. We said that 
"the ingredient of personal compulsion against an accused" 
was lacking where the summons was directed against the accountant; 
where he, not the taxpayer, was the only one compelled to do any-
thing; where he also had an interest in view of his duty to prepare 
income tax returns accurately from records made available to him. 
We further said: 
the criterion for Fifth Amendment immunity 
remains not the ownership of property but 
the 'physical or moral compulsion' exerted. 
(409 U.S. at 336.) 
Although the emphasis in Couch was on the abs ence of 
possession, footnote 20 contains the following caveat: 
we do indeed attach constitutional importance 
to possession, but only because of its close 
relationship to those personal compulsions and 
intrusions which the Fifth Amendment forbids. 
Yet, contrary to any intimation in the dissent 
(by Justice Marshall), we do not adopt any per 
se rule. We also decline to conjecture broadly 
on the significance of possession in cases and 
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Comment 
This is a close case for me. I would not decide it 
on the basis of a "bright line" between ownership and posses-
sion of papers that fairly could be called "private." Where .... 
the taxpayer does have possession (certainly, where possession 
exists prior to the summons), the issue turns on the nature of 
the records. If, for example, the only records here involved 
were the checkbooks (check stubs and cancelled checks) of the 
taxpayers, and these had been returned by the accountant, these 
private papers clearly would be protected. But here the accountant 
had taken information from taxpayers' records. Although the 
substance of the information may well have been the same as tax-
payers' records, its form was different. In a sense (at least) 
it was the work product of the accountant, and evidently was 
deemed necessary for his use in preparing the tax returns. 
The books are full of cases in this twilight area of 
Fifth Amendment rights, and even the Supreme Court cases leave 
me in doubt as to the application of the general principles 
summarized by me in Couch and repeated in Bellis. At least one 
can say that Boyd (where the taxpayer had both possession and 
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It seems safe to say that the privilege is not 
available unless the documents sought are both (i) private 
papers of the party asserting the privilege, and (ii) are in 
his possession (actual or constructive). In Couch the papers 
were admittedly private and were owned by the party asserting 
the privilege; possession of these papers voluntarily -- and 
for an indefinite time -- had been relinquished to a third party. 
Since the DC found that the papers (the records) here involved 
belonged to (were owned by) the accountant, the answer to the case 
would be clear if any papers owned were also per se private. 
But an answer on this basis would be too formalistic. In my 
view, the legal or technical ownership of papers does not 
necessarily determine whether they are personal or private in 
the Fifth Amendment sense even when they are in the possession 
of the party asserting the privilege. 
If my view is correct, the first question in tnis case 
is whether these records -- conceded to be owned by the accountant 
were nevertheless personal and private to the Goldsmiths. 
Certainly, a strong argument can be made that they were as 
apparently the data was merely copied by hand from taxpayers' 
records. 
~ H"-y ~,L-t.... ;.,-. 
/4 J!t_ r.-.; __ , ~ _· L- . ..4 ? 
:~-;X ~~:;,~ 





Nos. 74-18 and 74-611 9. 
clerks, I reach this conclusion, the additional question would 
remain whether relinquishment of possession to counsel altered 
the situation. I am inclined to think not, but again I need 
further reflection and assistance from my clerks. 
This is quite an important case for the government, 
and the administration of our tax laws. 
important Fifth Amendment question. 
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BOBTAIL MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
Carl Schenker 
DATE: October 25, 1975 
FROM: 
Re: No. 74-18 Fisher v. United States 
No. 74-611 United States v. Kasmir 
May a taxpayer invoke the Fifth to prevent production 
of his accountant's workpapers when such p&pers have been 
transferred to him and subsequently to an attorney? I agree 
with your tentative "yes". Your aid-to-memory, however, terms 
this a close case. Having had the benefit of respondent 
Kasmir' s brief (which you did not)
1 
I find the case rather easy.,'( 
I take as needing no real consideration the point that 
any privilege survives the transfer of the workpapers to the 
taxpayer's attorney. The government concedes this point, 
and with good reason. Couch recognized that a clear 
constructive possession on behalf of a taxpayer would allow 
invocation of the privilege; it is hard to imagine a clearer 
constructive possession than that involved in the attorney-
client relationship. 
*I don't want to sound intemperate, but the SG's brief is a 
s candal. Over and over again he correctly says the crucial 
issue is whether the workpapers were the taxpayer's "private 
papers." But he never analyzes that question. Instead - out 
of stupidity or the hope that the Court is stupid - he tries 
to make it appear that such "institutional pa~ers" cases as 
Bellis answer that question. Although Kasmir s brief incor-





- - 2. 
The question then becomes whether the material sought 
here falls within the ambit of the Fifth's protection. The 
Government suggests two reasons why the Fifth does not apply. 
(1) The papers, produced by an accountant, are not "private 
papers," and (2) the compelled production of papers which 
only the accountant can authenticate is not "testimonial 
compulsion". 
(1) "Private papers." In Fisher the accountant's 
workpapers consisted of a list of disbursements and receipts 
that the taxpayer himself could have compiled. At oral 
argument you might ask exactly what the workpapers in Kasmir 
contained; the parties don't say. I'll assume that the 
Kasmir papers were also a product that the taxpayer himself 
could have turned out. 
If the papers had been physically prepared by a taxpayer, 
they would be within the privilege. The issue is whether 
papers prepared by an accountant on the basis of information 
supplied by the taxpayer are insufficiently "private" to be 
shielded by the privilege . The "private papers" concept 
derives from the "institutional papers" cases like Bellis. 
It really has no relevance here. Who physically compiles 
documents dealing with the financial affairs of an individual 
should make no difference. As you said in Couch: 
[It would be meaningless to] hold here that the 
business records which petitioner actually owned 
would be protected in the hands of her accountant, 





accountant by letter and conversations in which 
the accountant took notes, in addition to the 
accountant's workpapers and photocopies of 
petitioner's records, would not be subject to 
3. 
a claim of privilege since title rested in the 
accountant. Such a holding would thus place 
unnecessary emphasis on the form of communication 
to an accountant and the accountant's own working 
methods, while diverting the inquiry from the 
basic purposes of the Fifth Amendment's protections. 
(409 U.S. at 332). 
Thus, the workpapers are "personal" to the taxpayer 
and in his (constructive) possession. He should be able to 
invoke the Fifth against their compelled production. (The 
taxpayers are correct in contending that their ability to 
invoke the Fifth is not lost because the contents of the 
papers have pr eviously been disclosed to the accountants 
or, in part, to the Government.) 
(2) "Testimonial compulsion." This argument is just 
more drivel. The SG is right that the accountant would be 
the only one who could authenticate the papers. But the 
papers are relevant only insofar as they reflect what the 
taxpayer "said." It can't be thought that if the taxpayer 
himself wrote down the information he could be compelled 
to give it up simply because no one would be forcing him 
to "testify". The result shouldn't change just because the 
authenticating testimony in the two cases would come from 
different sources. In either case the taxpayer faces the 
"trilemm:/ of falsification, self-incrimination, or cont empt. 
As to the subsidiary question whether Kasmir's attorney 
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type testimony from the taxpayer is in order, it~ no problem 
for the Government to get it. 
c.s. 
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Is Couch Controlling? 
U.S. v. Kasmir 
Fisher v. U.S. 
111~17~--
Both sides rely upon my opinion in Couch v. United States, 
409 U.S. 322. The relevant facts may be sunnnarized: 
(i) The sunnnons was directed to taxpayer's 
accountant. 
(ii) It called for production of "all books, 
records, b~nk statements, cancelled checks, deposit 
ticket copies, workpapers [etc.] pertaining to the tax 
liability" of Mrs. Couch. 
(iii) The accountant was "an independent contractor" -
not an employee of Couch. 
(iv) Although the accountant had possession Couch 
"retained title in herself". 
(v) After service of the summons, the accountant 
delivered the records to petitioners attorney. 
The Question 
Whether the "ownership'of these personal, business, 
records by Couch entitled her to invoke the privilege where 
the records were in the possession of her accountant? 
Rationale of our Decision 
The emphasis throughout the opinion was on the "personal" 




"The ingredient of personal compulsion against an 
accused is lacking" where the records are in the 
possession of a third party. (329) 
"Possession bears the closest relationship to the 
personal compulsion forbidden by the Fifth Amend-
ment." (331) 
2. 
In commenting on Perlman v. U.S., 247 U.S. 7, we said 
that the "expectation of privacy [in the documents] had been 
destroyed when [taxpayer] voluntarily surrendered" the 
documents. (332) 
"We do indeed believe that actual possession of 
documents bears the most significant relationship to Fifth 
Amendment protections against governmental compulsion ..•. " 
(333). 
We did recognize that situations could arise where 
"cons tructive possession is so clear or the relinquishment 
of possession is so temporary and i n significant as to leave 
the personal compulsions upon the accused substantial intact". 
(333) 
Finally, in the concluding paragraph, we said "There 
exists no legitimate expectation of privacy and no semblance 
of government compulsion" where, as in Couch the private 
papers had been delivered more or less permanently to a third 
party". 
J'( ;'( * i( 
Mr. Justice Brennan, concurring, said: 
"I join the opinion of the Court on the understanding 





claim of Fifth Amendment privilege whenever the 
documents in question are not in the possession 
of the person claiming the privilege. In my 
view, the privilege is available to one who 
turns records over to a third person for 
custodial safekeeping rather than disclosure 
of information .... The privilege cannot 
extend, however, to the protection of a taxpayer's 
records conveyed to a retained accountant for use 
in preparation of an income tax return, where the 
accountant is himself obligated to prepare a 
complete and lawful return." 
L.F.P., Jr. 
3. 
No. 74-611 U.S. v. Kasmir 
No. 74-18 Fisher v. U.S. 
Ia Couch Controlling? 
Both sides rely upon my opinion in Couch v. United States, 
409 U. s. 322. ' The relevant facts Dilly be aunnarized :· .:· 
(1) The SUIIIDOn& was directed to taxpayer's 
accountant. 
(ii) It called for production of "all books, 
records, bank statements• cancelled checks, de'posit 
ticket copies, workpa~r• (etc.] pertaining to the 'tax 
liability" of Mrs. Couch~' 
(iii) The accountant was ''an ind~pendent contractor" 
not an employee of Couch. 
(iv) Although the accountant had · possession Couch 
"retained title in. herself". 
. -·-- ~ ·· ~; \ •~,.. I a"'.)> i ,., 
· (v) ·,, After" service ~f thfi swmno~s, ·t11e ·accountant 
. ' 
delivered the records' to·. ~~itionen_- att~~•Y. 
The Question 
Whether the "ownership''of ' these peraona_l, business, 
•. 
records by Couch entitled her to invoke the privilege where 
the records were in the possession of her accountant? 
Rationale of our Decision 
The emphasis throu,hou_t the opinion was on the "personal" 
nature of the privilege. We said: 
"The ingredient of personal compulsion against . an 
accused is lacking" where the records are in the 
possession of a .~hird party. (329) 
• - • r "'· ~ • r 1 :.: 
~·'Possession' ·bears , the closest 'relationship t 'o the 
pers9nal . cOD1l)µl~iop forbidden by tlie Fifth Amend-
aaent·.-~•.. (331) 
..l,.·• ,~ I <.·' \ ~ ~; ..a:... j I 
2. 
In conmenting on Perlman v. U.S., 247 U.S. 7, we said 
•, ,,_,..,L., .--
that·. the"·'.~expe~tatf:.~n ~-f : privacy [in the documents) had been 
-- ., - ~- ,! J,, -. ~-- ~ • ' 
destroyed when [taxpayer]' voluntari_ly surrendered" the 
documents. (332) 
''We do indeed believe that actu,l possession of 
documents bears the ,most signifi.cant relationship to Fifth 
Amendment protections against · governmental compulsion ••• · ." 
(333). 
We did recognize that situations could a1:ise ~re 
"conatruct'~ve po·ssession i~ so clear or 'tlte relinquishme_nt 
of possession is so temporary and iltlignificant as to leave 
the personal compulsions. upon the accused substantial intact". 
(333) 
Finally, in the concluding paragraph, we said "There - . 
exists no legitimate expectatio~ of privacy and no semblance 
of government compulsion"· where, as in Couch the private 
pape~• had been delivered more or less permanently to a third 
party". 
* * * * 
Mr. justice Brennan, concurring, said: . 
"I join the opinion of the Court on the understanding 
t~t it does not establish a per se rule c:lefea.ting a 
88 
claim of Fifth Amendment privilege whenever the 
documents in question are not in the possession 
of the person claiming the privilege. In my 
view, _the privilege ia available to one who 
turns records over to a third person for 
custodial safekeeping rather than disclosure 
of information. -••• The privilege cannot 
extend, however, to the protection of• taxpayer ' s 
records conveyed to a retained accountant for use 
in preparation of an income tax ·return, where the 
accountant is h~elf obligated to prepare a 
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No. 74-18 Fisher v. U.S. 
No. 74-611 U.S. v. Kasmir 
Judge Friendly's opinion in Beattie. 
II/~, 1>" 
The most thoughtful opinion written recently in this 
opaque area is that of Judge Friendly in U.S. Beattie, decided 
by an unanimous panel of CA2 on August 18, 1975. 
The Facts. 
IRS informed Beattie on January 9, of its inve stigation 
of his taxes. On Januar y 18, long before any sunnnons was 
served, Beattie's accountant - at the request of Beattie's 
lawyers delivered to Beattie "various workpapers, trial 
balances and schedules" prepared by the accountant in 
connection with Beattie 1 s tax returns. 
On September 13, a summons was directed to Beattie 
to produce these papers, which he had retained in his possession. 
The papers or records - described as "accountants workpapers" -
were the accountant's property, not the taxpayer's. 
Friendly's analysis. 
Judge Friendly, starting with Boyd, emphasized that the 
privilege protects "an accused's communications" (Boyd, 384 
U.S. at 763), and the subpoena in the case before CA2 was 






Compelling an accused to produce his own records is the 
equivalent of requiring him to take the stand and admit 
their genuineness. See Curcio v. U.S., 354 U.S. 118, 125. 
Judge Friendly noted: 
" ... if an accused is forced to produce his own 
papers, with the consequence that the prosecutor 
can put them in evidence without further ado, he 
is in effect forced to take the stand if he wishes 
to dispute or explain them." 
·k -,'( * -/( -;'( 
"By responding to the sunnnons in this case, 
the taxpayer would not be admitting the genuineness, 
correctness or reliability of the accountant's 
workpapers." 
History and policy of the privilege. 
Friendly started with the familiar quotation from 
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm., which identified seven "fundamental 
values" supporting the privilege. He dismissed, as irrelevant 
to this case, all of these except the Fifth, namely, "our 
respect for the inviolability of the human personality and 
of the right of each individual 'to a private enclave where 
he may lead a private life'". 
But Friendly could find no interest of privacy in the 
case before him. He noted that Beattie 1had allowed the 
accountant to prepare the work papers and had permitted 
their retention by him for many years"; that the accountant 
could be subpoenaed and testify about the papers, which 





surrender of the papers themselves. At this point, Friendly 
quoted Couch: 
"By its very nature, the privilege is an intimate 
and personal one". 
Distinguishing Couch 
Beattie relied primarily on Couch, and Friendly went 
to great pains to distinguish it. He relies on language in 
Couch which emphasizes the personal nature of the privilege, 
and on the Court's position (as Judge Friendly perceives it) 
that "ownership unaccompanied by possession was insufficient 
to trigger the privilege". 
It is obvious that the language in Couch is at least 
ambiguous, and footnote 12, as Friendly notes - can certainly 
be relied upon by the taxpayer. But Couch does not 




No. 74-18 Fisher v. U.S. 
No. 74-611 U.S. v. Kasmir 
Judge Friendly's opinion in Beattie. 
The most thoughtful opinion written recently in this 
opaQue area is that of .Judge Friendly in U.S. Beattie, decided 
by an unanimous panel of ,.CA2 on August 18, 1975. 
The Facts. 
IRS informed Beattie on January 9, of its investigation 
of his taxes. On JanuaJ:!_ 18, long before any summons was 
served, -Beattie's accountant - .at t~e request of Beattie's 
lawyers delivered to Beattie "various workpapers, trial 
balances and schedules,.-_ prepare·d by the accountant in 
connection .-with .Beattie~s -tax returns. 
On Septembei•', 13; ·a 'summons was' directed to Beattie 
to i.produce= t:hese ,p·apers ·, r,which he had retained in his possession 
The papers or .records - descrlbed as "accountant\! workpapers" -
were the accountant .. , s pro1>Eirty! not the taxpayer's. 
Friendly's analysis. 
Judge Friendly, starting with Boyd, emphasized that the 
' 
privilege protects "an accused's communications" (Boyd, 384 
U.S. at 763), and the subpoena in the case before CA2 was 
directed against the accountant's "communications", not 
Beattie-' s. 
2. 
Compel~ing an accused to produce his own records is the 
equivalent of requiring him to take the stand -and admit 
their genuineness. See Curcfo v. U.S., 3S4 U.S. 118, 125. -J 
Judge Friendly noted: 
" ••• if an accused is forced to p~oduce his own 
papers, with tl:\e consequence thst the prosecutor 
can put them in evidence without further ado, he 
is in effect forced to take the stand -if he wishes 
to dispute or ex~lsin them." 
* * * * * 
"By responding to the sUDl!lons in this c~se, 
the taxpayer would not be admitting the genuineness , 
correctness or reliability of the accountant's 
workpapers." 
History and policy of the privilege. 
Friendly started with the familiar quotation from 
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm._, which identified seven "fundamental 
value~" supporting the privilege. He dismissed, as irrelevant 
to this csse, all of these except the Fifth, namely, "our 
res~ct _ for the ~nv~"ol.abilJty of the human 'personality · and 
' . ' 
.'.· 1 
of .the r _ight· of ·_each,:ljidividual •·to a l>rivate enclave where 
he ~may lead a private life ' "• 
• l t : , , , 
' . . :,., 
But Friendly ' could. find ·no interest of privacy in the 
~a•~-ibefore . hiin. He n~t!!d that Beattie 'had allowed the 
accountant to prepare the work papers and had permitted 
their retention by 'him for many years"; that the accountant 
could be subpoenaed and testify a'f?out the papers, which 
would be no~greater invasion of Beattie's rights than 
3. 
surrender of the papers themselves. At this point, Friendly 
quoted Couch: 
"By its very nature, the privilege is. an intimate 
and personal one~''· · 
Distinguishing Couch 
Beattie relied prima~ily on Couch, and Friendly went 
• LJ 
to great pains to distinguish it~ ,He relies on language in 
~ 
Couch which emphasizes the personal nature of the privilege, 
' . 
and on the Court's· po9.ition (as . Judge · Friendly perceives it) 
, 1 ~· 
that "ownership unaccompanied by possession was insufficient 
to trigger the privilege". 
It is obvious that the language in Couch is at least 
ambigu?~~-,, ,and . f ?OtJtote i2,, as F'ri_endly notes - can certainly 
~-. "~· -... ill . · -.. 
be relied upon by the taxpayer. But Couch does not 
'" . 
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The purpose of this memo is to summarize the facts in 
these cases primarily for the purpose of facilitating 
comparison with the facts in Couch: 
Kasmir and Cand; 
(Respondents CA) 
The taxpayer in this case is Dr. Edward Mason. When 
IRS agents requested permission to examine Mason's books and 
records, he initially complied but on the same day - upon 
advice of his accountant (Candy) - Dr. Mason declined to 
allow further examination. Following Mason's telephone 
call, accountant Candy immediately called attorney Kasmir; 
the latter telephoned Mason, and advised him not to cooperate 
with the agents. 
The next morning, the accountant Candy delivered to 
taxpayer Mason various documents pertaining to Mason's 
tax returns for 69-71. The documents included "workpapers 
of the accounting firm". 
The next day (two days after the first interview) IRS 
Slll@lonses were served on accountant Candy and lawyer Kasmir. 
- ~ ...., au: us ...... ~ 
Kasmir was requested to produce the records thatthe accounting 
firm had turned over to Mason, who in turn has delivered 
them to the lawyer. The summons to accountant Candy sought 
only his personal testimony concerned these records. Candy 





Holding of GAS 
1. Citing Couch CAS held that Candy must comply with 
the summons, and give his testimony concerning the documents. 
This holding is not an issue. 
As to lawyer Kasmir, GAS held: 
(i) The documents belonged to the accounting 
firm. 
(ii) Mason, the taxpayer, had acquired rightful 
possession by virtue of the transfer prior to service. 
(iii) The transfer by the taxpayer to his attorney, 
Kasmir, did not decrease the taxpayer's rights to claim 
the privilege. GAS sustained the taxpayer's privilege, 
relying on Couch that lawful possession was the controlling 
fact. 
-;'( * i 1( i": 1< 
Goldsmith's Case (Petitioners in 74-18) 
The Facts 
An agent of IRS visited Goldsmith in July 1971, advising 
that he was investigating his tax returns. Shortly thereafter, 
the Goldsmiths retained Fisher to represent them. On counsel's 
advice, Goldsmith requested his accountant, Berson, to deliver 
all records in the accountant's possession concerning the 






this request, and shortly thereafter the taxpayer delivered 
the accountant's records to attorney Berson. 
Several weeks later, a summons was served on the accountant 
for the documents. Upon being advised that the accountant no 
longer had them, a summons was served on attorney Fisher, who 
declined to deliver the documents then in his possession. 
The documents consisted of "listings" of cancelled 
checks and deposits, taken directly from the cancelled checks 
and deposit slips of the taxpayers. The accountant testified 
that this "listing" was bookkeeping work rather than an 
accounting function, and that he did not consider them to be 
accountant's workpapers. This function of addition and 
multiplication had been performed for these taxpayers for 
some 25 years by this accountant, who turned the summaries 
over to the taxpayers for their permanent possession - usually 
three or four years after preparation. 
Holding of CA3 
The District Court, after an evidentiary hearing, con-
cluded that the records were "accountant's workpapers", 
were owned by accountant, and that ownership negated the 
taxpayer's Fifth Amendment claim. 




No. 74-18 Fisher v. U.S. (CA3) 
No. 74-611 U.S. v. Kasmir {CAS) 
The purpose of this memo is to sunmarize the ·facts in 
these cases primarily for the ·· purpose of facilitating 
comparison with the facts :i.n Couch: 
Kasmir and Cand! 
(Lspondents CA) 
The taxpayer in this case ~s Dr. Edward. Mason. When 
IRS agents requested permission to ·examin• Mason's books and 
records, he initially complied but on the same da)'. - upon 
advice of bia accountant (Candy) ·- - Dr. Mason declined to 
allow further examination. Following Maaon'a _telephone 
call, accountant candy imned~atelY. called attorney Kasmir; 
the latter .telephoned Mason, and advised him not to cooperate 
with the . agents. 
The next morning, the accountant Candy delivered to 
tppayer-· ~•o" 1.varioua ci~nta pertaining to ·Mason's 
~Jc_• , 1,,,• • • -.,. ,- l ,., '. I • • i': ' 
tax returns for 69-71. The documents included '.'workpapers 
•· 
firm". 
The ,next ,day (t~ 4-Y• after the first interview) .- IRS 
, . 
.. ~ - \ .· 
auanonaes were served on accountant candy and ·1a,.,er Kasmir. 
Kasmir waa requested to produce the records thatthe accounting 
firm had turned over to Mason, who in. turn has delivered 
' 
them to the lawyer. The 8U111Dona to accountant Candy sought 
only hia personal teatimony concerned. theae records. Candy 
and Kaamir both i=-efuaed to comply • 
~ ' "' 
2. 
Holding of CA.5 
1. Citing- Couch CAS held _that Candy must comply with 
the aunmons, and give hi~ testimony concerning the document•,• 
Thie holding ' is not an issue. 
Aa to lawyer Kasmir, CAS held: 
(i) The documents belonged to the accounting 
firm. 
(ii) Mason, the taxpayer, had acquired rightful 
po~seasion by virtue of the transfer prior to service. 
(iii) The transfer by the taxpayer to his attorney, 
Kasmir, did not decrease the taxpayer's rights to claim 
the privilege. CAS sustained the taxpayer's privilege, 
relying on Couch that law~ul possession was t~e controlling 
fact. 
***** 
Goldsmith'• Case (Petitioners in 74~18) 
The Facts 
An agent of IRS visited Goldsmith in July 1971, adv.ising 
that he was investigating his tax returns. Shortly thereafter., 
the Goldsmiths retained Fisher to represent them: ·· On counsel's 
advice, Goldsmith requested his .accountant, Berson, to deliver 
all records in the accountant's possession concerning the 
. ' 
tax returns of the Goldsmiths. The accountant complied with 
~ .. -~ 
3. 
this request, and ahortly _thereafter the taxpayer delivered 
the accountant's records to attorney Berson. 
Several weeks later, a sUD1Dons was served on the accountant 
for the documents. Upon being advised that the accountant no 
• •' I 
longer had them, a SU111110ns was served on attorney Fisher, who 
declined to deliver the documents then in his possession. 
The documents consisted of "listings'' of cancelled 
checks and depoaits, taken directly from the cancelled checks 
11 •• 
and deposit slips' ot' the tax~yera. The accountant testified 
that this "listing'' was bo~kkeep~ work rather than an 
accounting function, and that he did not consider them to be 
accountant's workpapers. Thia- function of addition and 
multiplication had been performed for these taxpayers for 
some 25 years by this accountant, who turned the summaries 
over to the taxpayers for their permanent possession - usually 
three ~r four years after preparation. 
Holding of CA3 
The District Court, after an evidentiary hearl~g, .con• 
eluded that the records were "accountant•·• workpap~ra" ~ 
were owned by accountant, and that ownership negated the 
taxpayer's Fifth Amendment claim. 
CA3 en banc,with one dissent, affirmed the DC. - . 
L.F.P., Jr • 
•• 
;, ,, rfo. 74-1~ FlSHER v. U.S. cont. 11/)//) -~e;-o • 
Tlt r ('hid .Justice P~ ("1v ,,.rJ).:f:j, Do uvhs, J. ~ 
Brrnnan, J: ~ '"'"' Sic,rart, J. Aft::_ 
( 
"\vhit c, J . - ~Iar~liall. J . • 
. 
~-
Blackmun, J. ~ 
J Powell, J. , ~ Rehnquist, J. ~ 
-
CHAMBERS OF" 
-~u:prtmt <qoud of flrt 1linittb ~tatte-
~as-lp:ttghttt, ~- <q:. 2llffe){..'.J 
JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN. JR. January 28, 1976 
RE: Nos. 74-18 & 74-611 Fisher and Kasmir v. 
United States 
Dear Byron: 
I'll be writing a separate opinion in the 
above. 
Mr. Justice White 
cc: The Conference 
s~ 
/ 
- -.:§u:prtnu <qcm-t of tlrt ~ tb ~ taug 
~as!pnghm.10, QJ. 2llffe>!-~ 
CHAM B ERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST / 
January 29, 1976 
Re: Nos. 74-18 and 74-611 - Fisher v. United States, 
et al. 
Dear Byron: 
P]..ease join me. 
Sincerely, 
l)_.(V.IY 
Mr. Justice White 







Re: Fisher v. United Staes, No. 74-18 
United States v. Kasmir, No. 74-611 
- fJAN. vn,: l ' _) 
As you will see when you read this circulation, it is a widely 
sweeping opinion (reaching issues that may not be necessary to the 
disposmtion of the case). I am not prepared to give you any 
xeiiak2x reliable help on your vote until I can study tha case 
more closely. Accordingly I ask you to defer voting for the 
time being, for the reason to be stated. 
The next argument calendar involves Andresen v. Maryland, 
No. 74-1646. I will be doing the bench memo in that~~ case, 
where one of the issues is whether papers protected by the Fifth 
Amendment ruling of Boyd may be seized fil[KMX pursuant to search 
warrant. In connection with that bench memo I will have to read 
the cases that are relevant to KD Kasmir and Fisher. Th.us, 
I will be in a position to give you XHXXK a much more informed 
view on some of the difficult and subtle points presented in this 
case after I have read those cases. I propose to make that bench 
major 
memo my next/order of business after redrafting ~tKXXtM Ristaino. 
fs 
If you need my views sooner, please let me know. 
~ 
~(\~ hoA~ ~ 'iA,J-
w, b,_ ~~;j_ ~~ r 'SD 








Re: Fisher & Kasmir, Nos. 74-18 and 74-611 
{)AN . l'f,, D 
You can and should join this opinion. (Having been educated 
more fully in this area, I hereby recant at least some of my 
bobtail memorandum.) I have only two things to bring to your 
attention. 
(1 ) AT p. 9 the circulation says that "private information" 
derives whatever protection it has from sources other than the 5th 
amendment--specifying the fourth amendment,aRa the first amendment, 
an~ evidentiary privileges. I mention this because you may or 
may not think that there are other sources for the protection of 
private information. Specifically, your concurring statement in 
8£kaikxxxx California Bankers, 416 U.S., does not make clear 
what you perceive as the sources of privacy. I take it from the 
general tenor of the statement that you principally had first and 
- - - ~ 
fourth amendment notions in mind. If so, Justice White's formulation -guards your concerns. --
(2) At pp. 8, 15-16, p. 28 n.11, Justice White relies upon 
Katz et al for the proposttion that oral communications may be .KKXX 
seized and~ introduced without violation of the Fifth Amendment, 
thus substantiating the proposition that written documents may also 
be. The trouble is that the Court has never so held (despite his 
use of the word "holdings" on p. 8). This matter is discussed in 
my bench memo on Andresen. The Andresen case does squarely present 
the issue of whether communications may be seized consistently with 
the Fifth Amendment if Fourth amendment safeguards are met. It might. 






real holdings for the Kt{HXXHX Fourth-Fifth Amendment discussion. 
On the other hand, the result in Andresen appears to me to be 
a foregone conclusion, so perhaps this does no harm. Unless the 
conference vote in Andresen is inconsistent with Justice White's 
reliance on Katz, the statements made are in themselves good 
predictions of the proper Fifth Amendment~ analysis of 
the seizure of communications. 
CJ_ 
~ 
P.S. I have one minor technical reservation. The statement of 
what was sought in No. 74-611 is set out at p.2. It includes 
XXKXXXIUiK " retained copies" of correspondence. The latter part 
of the opinion presumes that nCf of the documents sought were 
written by the taxpayers and relies heavily on that notion. It 
shou ld therefore be made clear that the subpoena is construed to 
n ot to include letters from the taxpayer to the accountant. I 
mentioned this to John Nields and he agrees Kit that it should 
be noted. He will bring that to Justice White's attention. 
- - To: 
• 
STYLISTIC CHANGES THROUGHOUT'! Mr . JuotLca Mr . JuGtict3 
SEE PAGES: 6',. 7 ,, 9,, / o - / ..:T~ ,.,,, 7 t:>( ~ a1.~ Mr . Ju:·,ti.c3 H :C;1,. ,1i.s t 
Mr. J ustice StJJcns 
~ -
~t-
From: Mr. Justic o White 
Circulated: ____ _ 
Recirculated: cz( - / 7 t' 
2nd DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATffl 
OS. 74-18 AND 74-611 
Solomon Fisher et al., On Writ of Certiorari to the 
Petitioners, United States Court of Appeals 
74-18 v. for the Third Circuit. 
United States et al. 
United States et al. , 
Petitioners, 
74-611 v. 
C. D. Kasmir and 
Jerry A. Candy. 
On Writ of Certiorari to the 
United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit. 
[January - , 1976] 
MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
In these two cases we are called upon to decide whether 
a summons directing an attorney to produce documents 
delivered to him by his client in connection with the 
attorney-client relationship is enforceable over claims 
that the documents were constitutionally immune from 
summons in the hands of the clients and retained that 
immunity in the hands of the attorneys. 
I 
In each case, an Internal Revenue agent visited the 
taxpayer or taxpayers 1 and interviewed them in con-
nection with an investigation of possible civil or criminal 
liability under the federal income tax laws. Shortly 
1 In No. 74-18, the taxpayers are husband and wife who filed a 
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FISHER v. UNITED STATES 
-
after the interviews-one day later in No. 74--611 and 
a week or two later in No. 74--18-the taxpayers obtained 
from their respective accountants certain documents re-
lating to the preparation by the accountant of their tax 
returns. Shortly after obtaining the documents-later 
the same day in No. 74--611 and a few weeks later in 
No. 74--18-the taxpayers transferred the documents to 
their lawyers-respondent Kasmir and petitioner Fisher, 
respectively-each of whom was retained to assist the 
taxpayer in connection with the investigation. Upon 
learning of the whereabouts of the documents, the 
Internal Revenue Service served summonses on the 
attorneys directing them to produce documents listed 
therein. In No. 74--611, the documents were described 
as "the following records of Tannebaum Bindler & L€wis 
[ the accounting firm] : 
"1. Accountant's workpapers pertaining to Dr. 
E. J. Mason's books and records of 1969, 1970 and 
1971.2 
"2. Retained copies of E. J. Mason's income tax 
returns for 1969, 1970 and 1971. 
"3. Retained copies of reports and other corre-
spondence between Tannebaum Bindler & Lewis 
and Dr. E. J. Mason during 1969, 1970 and 1971." 
In No. 74--18, the documents demanded were analyses: 
by the accountant of the taxpayers' income and expenses 
which had been copied by the accountant from the tax-
payers' cancelled checks and deposit receipts.3 In No. 
74--611 , a summons was also served on the accountant 
directing him to appear and testify concerning the docu-
.2 The "books and records" concerned taxpayer's large medical 
practice . 
3 The husband taxpayer's checks and deposit receipts related to 
his textile waste business. The wife's related to her women's wea:r· 
.a.hop. 
-
74-18 & 74-611-0PINTO 
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-
3 
ments to be produced by the lawyer. In each case, the 
lawyer declined to comply with the summons directing 
production of the documents, and enforcement actions 
were commenced by the Government under 26 U. S. C. 
§§ 7402 (b) and 7604 (a). In No. 74-611, the attorney 
raised in defense of the enforcement action the taxpay-
er's accountant-client privilege, his attorney-client privi-
lege, and his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. In 
No. 74-18, the attorney claimed that enforcement would 
involve compulsory self-incrimination of the taxpayers 
in violation of their Fifth Amendment privilege, would 
involve a seizure of the papers without necessary com-
pliance with the Fourth Amendment, and would violate· 
the taxpayers' right to communicate in confidence with 
their attorney. In No. 74-18 the taxpayers intervened 
and made similar claims. 
In each case the summons was ordered enforced by 
the District Court and its order was stayed pending 
appeal. In No, 74-18, F'isher v. United States, - F. 2d 
- (1974), petitioners' appeal raised, in terms, only 
their Fifth Amendment claim, but they argued in con-
nection with that claim that enforcement of the sum-
mons would involve a violation of the taxpayers' reason-
able expection of privacy and particularly so in light, 
of the confidential relationship of attorney to client .. 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit after reargu-
ment en bane affirmed the enforcement order, holding-
that the taxpayers had never acquired a possessory inter-
est in the documents and that the papers were not 
immune in the hands of the attorney. In No. 74-611, 
a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit reversed the enforcement order, Kasmir v. United 
States, - F. 2d - (1974). The court reasoned that 
by virtue of the Fifth Amendment the documents would' 
h.ave been privileged from production pursuant to sum-
-
4 
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-
mons directed to the taxpayer had he retained possession 
and, in light of the confidential nature of the attorney-
client relationship, the taxpayer retained, after the trans-
fer to his attorney, "a legitimate expectation of privacy' 
with regard to the materials be placed in his attorney's 
custody, that he retained constructive possession of the 
evidence and thus retained Fifth Amendment protec-
tion." 4 We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict 
created. - U. S. -. Because in our view the docu-
ments were not privileged either in the hands of the 
lawyers or of their clients, we affirm the judgment of 
the Third Circuit in No. 74---18 and reverse the judgment 
of the Fifth Circuit in No. 74---611. 
II 
All of the parties in this case and the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit have concurred in the proposi-
tion that if the Fifth Amendment would have excused 
a taxpayer from turning over the accountant's papers 
had he possessed them, the attorney to whom they are 
delivered for the purpose of obtaining legal advice should 
also be immune from subpoena. Assuming for the 
moment the validity of this proposition, we are convinced 
that, under our decision in Couch v. United States, 409' 
U. S. 322 (1973), it is not the taxpayer's Fifth Amend-
ment privilege that would excuse the attorney from 
production. 
The relevant part of that Amendment provides : 
"No person . ... shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself." (Emphasis 
added.) 
The taxpayer's privilege under this Amendment is not 
4 The respondent in No. 74-611 did not, in terms, rely on the 
attorney-client privilege or the Fourth Amendment before the Court. 
of Appeals. 
-
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violated by enforcement of the summonses involved in 
these cases because enforcement against a taxpayer's 
lawyer would not "compel" the taxpayer to do any-
thing-and certainly would not compel him to be a 
"witness" against himself. The Court has held repeat-
edly that the Fifth Amendment is limited to prohibiting 
the use of "physical or moral compulsion" exerted on 
the person asserting the privilege, Perlman v. United 
States, 247 U. S. 7, 15 (1918); United States v. Johnson, 
228 U. S. 457, 458 (1913); Couch v. United States, 410 
U.S. 322, 328-329, 336 (1973). See also Holt v. United 
States, 218 U. S. 245, 252 (1910); United States v. 
Dionisio, 410 U. S. 1 (1973) ; Schmerber v. Californ-ia, 
384 U. S. 757, 765 (1966); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 
U. S. 465, 476 (1921); Californ-ia Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 
416 U. S. 21, 55 (1974). In Couch v. United Statesr 
supra, we recently ruled that the Fifth Amendment 
rights of a taxpayer were not violated by the enforce-
ment of a documentary summons directed to her ac-
countant and requiring production of the taxpayer's own 
records in the possession of the accountant. We did so 
on the ground that in such a case "the ingredient of per-
sonal compulsion against an accused is lacking." Id., 
at 329. 
Here, the taxpayers are compelled to do no more 
than was the taxpayer in Couch. The taxpayers' Fifth 
Amendment privilege is therefore not violated by enforce-
ment of the summonses directed toward their attorneys. 
This is true whether or not the Amendment would have 
barred a subpoena directing the taxpayer to produce the 
documents while they were in his hands. 
The fact that the attorneys are agents of the taxpayers 
does not change this result. Couch held as much, 
since the accountant there was also the taxpayer's agent, 
and in this respect reflected a longstanding view. In 
... ~_,,.. -
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Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 69-70 (1906), the Court 
said that the privilege "was never intended to permit 
[a person] to plead the fact that some third person might 
be incriminated by his testimony, even though he were 
the agent of such person . . . the amendment is limited to 
a person who shall be compelled in any criminal case to 
be a witness against himself." (Emphasis in original.) 
" It is extortion of information from the accused which 
offends our sense of justice." United States v. Couch, 
supra, at 328. Agent or no, the lawyer is not the tax-
payer. The taxpayer is the "accused," and nothing is 
being extorted from him. 
Nor is this one of those situations, which Couch sug- I 
gested might exist, where constructive possession is so 
clear or relinquishment of possession so temporary and 
insignificant as to leave the personal compulsion upon 
the taxpayer substantially intact. United States v. 
Couch, supra, at 333. In this respect we see no differ-
ence between the delivery to the attorneys in these cases 
and delivery to the accountant in the Couch case. As 
was true in Couch, the documents sought were obtainable 
without personal compulsion on the accused. 
Respondents' argue, and the Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals apparently agreed, that if the summons was 
enforced, the taxpayers' Fifth Amendment privilege 
would be, but should not be, lost solely because they 
gave their documents to their lawyers in order to obtain 
legal advice. But this misconceives the nature of the 
constitutional privilege. The amendment protects a per-
son from being compelled to be a witness against himself. 
Here, taxpayers retained any privilege they ever had not 
to be compelled to testify against themselves and not 
to be compelled themselves to produce private papers 
in their possession. This personal privilege was in no 
way decreased by the transfer. It is simply that by 
-
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reason of the transfer of the documents to the attorneys, 
those papers may be subpoenaed without compulsion on 
the taxpayer. The protection of the Fifth Amendment 
is therefore not available. "A party is privileged from 
producing evidence but not from its production." John-
son v. United States, supra, at 458. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit suggested 
that because legally and ethically the attorney was re-
quired to respect the confidences of his client, the latter 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy for the records 
in the hands of the attorney and therefore did not forfeit 
his Fifth Amendment privilege with respect to the rec-
ords by transferring them in order to obtain legal advice. 
It is true that the Court has often stated that one of the 
several purposes served by the constitutional privilege 
against compelled testimonial self-incrimination is that of 
protecting personal privacy. See, for example, Murphy v. 
Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U. S. 52, 55 (1964); Couch v. 
United States, 409 U.S. 322, 332, 335-336 (1973); Tehan 
v. Shott, 382 U. S. 406, 416 (1966); Davis v. Unitecl 
States, 328 U. S. 582, 587 (1946). But the Court has 
never suggested that every invasion of privacy violates 
the privilege. Within the limits imposed by the language 
of the Fifth Amendment, which we necessarily observe, 
the privilege truly serves privacy interests; but the Court 
has never on any ground, personal privacy included, ap-
plied the Fifth Amendment to prevent the otherwise 
proper acquisition or use of evidence which, in the Court'S' 
view, did not involve compelled testimonial self-~ncri11t-
ination of some sort.5 
5 There is a line of cases in which the Court stated that the I 
Fifth Amendment was offended by the use in evidence of documents 
or property seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Goulea 
v. United States, 255 U. S. 298, 306 (1921) ; Agnello v. United States, 
269 U. S. 20, 33-34 (1925); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 
4_52, 467 (1932) , Ma7!p v. Ohio, 367 U S. 643, 661 (1961) (con.-
-
8 
74-18 & 74-611-0PINION 
FISHER v. UNITED STATES 
-
The proposition that the Fifth Amendment protects 
private information obtained without compelling self-
incriminating testimony is contrary to the clear holdings 
of this Court that under appropriate safeguards private 
incriminating statements of an accused may be overheard 
and used in evidence, if they are not compelled at the 
time they were uttered, Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 
347, 354 (1967); Osborn v. United States, 385 U. S. 323, 
329-330 (1966), and Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41 , 
57 ( 1967), cf. Hoff a v. United States, 385 U. S. 293, 304 
( 1966), and that disclosure of private information may 
be compelled if immunity removes the risk of incrimina-
tion. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441 (1972). 
If the Fifth Amendment protected generally against the 
obtaining of private information from a man's mouth 
or pen or house, its protections would presumably not be 
lifted by probable cause and a warrant or by immunity. 
The privacy invasion is not mitigated by immunity; and 
the Fifth Amendment's strictures, unlike the Fourth's, 
are not removed by showing reasonableness. The Fram-
ers addressed the subject of personal privacy directly in 
the Fourth Amendment. They struck a balance so that 
when the State's reason to believe incriminating evi-
dence will be found becomes sufficiently great, the in-
vasion of privacy becomes justified and a warrant to 
search and seize will issue. They did not seek in still 
another Amendment-the Fifth-to achieve a general 
protection of privacy but to deal with the more specific 
issue of compelled self-incrimination. 
curring opinion of Black, J.). But the Court purported to 
find elements of compulsion in such situations. "In either case he · 
is the unwilling source of the evidence, and t he 5th Amendment 
forbids that he shall be compelled to be a witness against himself · 
in a criminal case." Gouled v. United States, supra, at 306. In 
·any event the predicate for those cases, lacking here, was a violatiol)!.:. 
qf the Fourth Amencl.m,ent,. 
--
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We cannot cut the Amendment completely loose from 
the moorings of its language, and make it serve as a 
general protector of privacy-a word not mentioned in 
its text and a concept directly addressed in the Fourth 
Amendment. We adhere to the view that the Fifth 
Amendment protects against "compelled testimony not 
[the disclosure of] private information." United States 
v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225,233 n. 7 (1975) . 
Insofar as private information not obtained through 
compelled self-incriminating testimony is legally pro-
tected, its protection stems from other sources jl-the 
Fourth Amendment's protection against seizures without 
warrant or probable cause and against subpoenas which 
suffer from "too much indefiniteness or breadth in the 
things required to be 'particularly described,'" Oklahoma 
Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186-, 202 
(1946); In re Horowitz, 482 F. 2d 72, 75-80 (CAZ 1975) 
(Friendly, J.); the First Amendment, see NAACP v. 
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,462 (1958); or evidentiary privi-
leges such as the attorney-client privilege.7 
6 In Couch v. United States, supra, on which taxpayers rely for· 
their claim that the Fifth Amendment protects their "legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy," the Court differentiated between the things 
protected by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. "We hold today 
that no Fourth or Fifth Amendment claim can prevail where, as in 
this case, there exists no legitimate expectation of privacy and no 
semblance of governmental compulsion against the person of the 
accused." Id., at 336. 
7 The taxpayers have not raised arguments of a Fourth Amend-
ment nature before this Court and could not be successful if they had. I 
The summonses are narrowly drawn and seek only documents of un-
questionable relevance to the tax investigation. Special problems of 
privacy which might be presented by subpoena of a personal diary, 
United States v. Bennett, 409 F. 2d 888, 897 (CA2 1969), Friendly, 
J ., are not involved here. 
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Our above holding is that compelled production of 
documents from an attorney does not implicate what-
ever Fifth Amendment privilege the taxpayer might have 
enjoyed from being himself compelled to produce them, 
The taxpayers in these cases, however, have from the out-
set consistently urged that they should not be forced to 
expose otherwise protected documents to summons sim-
ply because they have sought legal advice and turned the 
papers over to their attorneys. The government appears 
to agree unqualifiedly. The difficulty is that taxpayers 
have erroneously relied on the Fifth Amendment without 
urging the attorney-client privilege in so many words. 
They have nevertheless invoked the relevant body of law 
and policies that govern the attorney-client privilege. 
In this posture of the case, we feel obliged to inquire 
whether the attorney-client privile e a lies to docu-
ments mt e an so an attorney which would ave been 
pnv1legea in tlie hands of th~ client by reason ~r th; 
Firth Amenilment.8 - ----
8 Fed. Rules Evid. Rule 501, 28 U. S. C. A., effective January 2, 
1975, provides that with respect to privileges the United States Dis-
trict Courts "shall be governed by the principles of the common law-
interpreted . . . in the light of reason and experience." Thus, l 
whether or not Rule 501 applies to this case, the attorney-client 
privilege issue is governed by the principles and authorities discussed 
and cited infra. Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. 26. 
In No. 74-611 , the taxpayers did not intervene, and their rights 
have been asserted only through their lawyers. The parties disagree 
o,n the question whether an attorney may claim the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege of his client. We need not resolve this question. The · 
only privilege of the taxpayers involved here is the attorney-client 
privilege and it is universally accepted that the attorney-client privi- -
1ege may be raised by the attorney, McCormick, supra, § 92, at 193, . 
§ 94, at 197; Republic Gear Co . v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F . 2d 551 
(CA2 1967) ; Bouschor v. United States, 316 F. 2d 451 (CA8 1963); 
,Qolton v. United States, 306 F . 2d 633 (CA2 1962) ; Schwimmer v~ 
-
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8onfidential disclosures by a client to an attorney I 
made in order to obtain legal assistance are privileged, 
8 Wigmore, Evidence, § 2292, supra; McCormick, Evi-
dence, § 87, et seq. The purpose of the privilege is to 
encourage clients to make full disclosure to their attor-
neys. 8 Wigmore, Evidence, § 2291, and § 2306, at 590, 
supra; McCormick, Evidence, § 87, p. 175, § 92, p. 192; 
Baird v. Koerner, 279 F. 2d 623 (CA9· 1960); Modern 
Woodmen of America v. Watkins, 132 F . 2d 352 (CA5 
1943); Prichard v. United States, 181 F. 2d 326 (CA6) 
aff'd, 339 U. S. 974; Schwimmer v. United States, 232 
F . 2d 855 (CA8 1956) ; Goldfarb v. United States, 32& 
F . 2d 280 (CA6 1964) . As a practical matter, if the 
client knows that damaging information could more 
readily be obtained from the attorney following disclosure 
than from himself in the absence of disclosure, the client 
would be reluctant to confide in his lawyer and it would 
be difficult to obtain fully informed legal advice. How-
ever, since the privilege has the effect of withholding rele-
vant inform-;-{ion from the fact-finder, it applies only 
w~ re necessary to achieve its purpose. ., A_gQ.ordingly it 
protects only those disclosures-necessary to obtain in-
formed legal aavice-which :rilight not have been made 
absent the privilege. In-;e H orowitz, 482 F. 2d 72, 81 
(dtt2 19 73) , .F'n endly, J. ; United States v. Goldfarb, 328 
F . 2d 280 (CA6 1964); 8 Wigmore, supra, § 2291, at 554 ; 
McCormick, supra, § 89, at 185. This Court and the 
lower courts have thus uniformly held that pre-existing 
documents which could have been obtained by court 
process from the client when he was in possession may 
also be obtained from the at torney by similar process fol-
lowing transfer by the client in order to obtain more in-
formed legal advice. Grant v. United S tates, 227 U. s_ 
United States, 232 F . 2d 855 (CA8 1956); cert. denied, 353 U. S_ 
&33; Bala..w.iri v. United. St.ates ,, 125 F . 2d. 812 (~A9 1942) . 
-
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74, 79-----80 (1913), 8 Wigmore, Evidence, § 2307 (Mc-
Naughton Rev. 1961), and cases there cited; McCormick, 
Evidence, § 90, p. 185 (2d ed. 1972'); Falsone v. United 
States, 205 F. 2d 734 (CA5 1953); Sovereign Camp v. 
Reid, 208 Ala. 457; Andrews v. Railway Co., 14 Ind. 169; 
Palatini v. Sarrian, 15 N. J. Super. 34; Pearson v. Yoder, 
39 Okla. 105; State v. Olwell, 64 Wash. 2d 828. The 
purpose of the privilege requires no proader rule. Pre-
existing documents obtainable from the client are not 
appreciably easier to obtain from the attorney after trans-
fer to him. Thus, even absent the attorney-client privi-
lege, clients will not be discouraged from disclosing the 
documents to the attorney and their ability to obtain 
informed legal advice will remain unfettered. It is other-
wise if the documents are not obtainable by subpoena 
duces tecum or summons while in the exclusive possession 
of the client, for the client will then be reluctant to trans-
fer possession to the lawyer unless the documents are also 
privileged in the latter's hands. Where the transfer is 
made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, the pur-
. poses of the attorney-client privilege would be defeated 
1.5 - unless the privilege wiB applicable. "It follows, then, 
that when the client himself would be privileged from 
production of the document either as a praty at common 
law ... or as exempt from self-incrimination, the attorney 
having possession of the document is not bound to pro-
duce." 8 Wigmore, supra, § 2307, at 592. Lower courts 
have so held. 8 Wigmore, Evidence, § 2307, p. 592 n. 1, 
and cases there cited; United States v. Judson, 322 F. 2d 
460, 466 (CA9 1963); Colton v. United States, 306 F. 2d 
633, 639 (CA2 1962); contra Bouschor v. United States, I 
316 F. 2d 451 (CA8 1963). This proposition was ac-
cepted by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals below, is 
asserted by petitioner in No. 74-18 and respondent in 
No. 74-611, and was conceded by the Government in its. 
-
?4-18 & '14-611-0PINIO 
FISHER v. UNITED STATES 
-
13 
brief and at oral argument. Where the transfer to the 
attorney is for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, we 
agree with it. 
Since each taxpayer transferred possession of the docu-
ments in question from himself to his attorney, in order 
to obtain legal assistance in the tax investigations in 
question, the papers, if unobtainable by summons from 
the client, are unobtainable by summons directed to the 
attorney by reason of the attorney-client privilege. We 
accordingly proceed to the question whether the docu-
ments could have been obtained by summons addressed 
to the taxpayer while the documents were in his posses-
sion. The only bar to enforcement of such summons 
asserted by the parties or the courts below is the Fifth 
Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. On 
this question the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit in this case is at odds with the Court of Appeals: 
for the Second Circuit, United States v. Beattie, -F. 2d 
- (1975) . 
III 
The proposition that the Fifth Amendment prevents: 
compelled production of documents over objection that 
such production might incriminate stems from Boyd v .. 
United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1886) . Boyd involved a 
civil forfeiture proceeding brought by the Government 
against two partners for fraudulently attempting to im-
port 35 cases of glass without paying the prescribed duty. 
The partnership had contracted with the Government to, 
furnish the glass needed in the construction of a govern-
ment building. The glass specified was foreign glass, it 
being understood that if part or all of the glass was· 
furnished from the partnership's existing duty-paid in-
ventory, it could be replaced by duty-free imports. Pur-
suant to this arrangement, 29 cases of glass were im-
12orted b:y t_he I?art_nershil? duty free. The partners thellJ. 
-
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represented that they were entitled to duty-free entry 
of an additional 35 cases which were soon to arrive. The 
forfeiture action concerned these 35 cases. The govern-
ment's position was that the partnership had replaced all 
of the glass used in construction of the government build-
ing when it imported the 29 cases. At trial, the gov-
ernment obtained a court order directing the partners to 
produce an invoice the partnership had received from 
the shipper covering the previous 29-case shipment. 
The invoice was disclosed, offered in evidence and used, 
over the Fifth Amendment objection of the partners, to 
establish that the partners were fraudulently claiming a 
greater exemption from duty than they were entitled to 
under the contract. This Court held that the invoice 
was inadmissible and reversed the judgment in favor 
of the Government. The Court ruled that the Fourth 
Amendment applied to court orders in the nature of sub-
poenas duces tecum in the same manner in which it 
applies to search warrants, id., at 622; and that the 
Government may not, consistent with the Fourth Amend-
ment, seize a person's documents or other property as 
evidence unless it can claim a proprietary interest in the 
property superior to that of the person from whom the 
property is obtained. Id., at 623-624. The invoice in 
question was thus held to have been obtained in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment. The Court went on to hold 
that the accused in a criminal case or the defendant in a 
forfeiture action could not be forced to produce eviden-
tiary items without violating the Fifth Amendment as 
well as the Fourth. More specifically, the Court de-
clared, "a compulsory production of the private books 
and papers of the owner of goods sought to be for-
feited ... is compelling him to be a witness against him-
self, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the 
Constitution." I d.1 at 634-635. Admitting the partner ... 
-
74-18 & 74-611-0PINION 
FISHER v. UNITED STATES 
-
15 
ship invoice into evidence had violated both the Fifth 
and Fourth Amendments. 
Among its several pronouncements, Boyd was under-
stood to declare that the seizur.e, under warrant or other-
wise, of any purely evidentiary materials violated the 
Fourth Amendment and that the Fifth Amendment ren-
dered these seized materials inadmissible. Gouled v. 
United States, 255 U. S. 298 (1921); Agnello v. United 
States, 269 U. S. 20 (1925); United States v. Lefkowitz, 
285 U. S. 452 (1932). That rule applied to documents 
as well as to other evidentiary items-"[t]here is no 
special sanctity in papers, as distinguished from other 
forms of property, to render them immune from search 
and seizure, if only they fall within the scope of the 
principles of the cases in which other property may be 
seized, . . . Gouled v. United States, supra, at 309. 
Private papers taken from the taxpayer, like other "mere 
evidence," could not be used against the accused over 
his Fourth and Fifth Amendment objections. 
Several of Boyd's express or implicit declarations have 
not stood the test of time. The application of the 
Fourth Amendment to subpoenas was limited by Hale v. 
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906), and more recent cases. See, 
for example, Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 
329 U. S. 186 (1946) , Purely evidentiary (but "non-
testimonial") 9 materials, as well as contraband and 
fruits and instrumentalies of crime, may now be searched 
for and seized under proper circumstances, Warden v. 
Hayden, 387 U. S. 294 (1967) . Also, any notion that 
"testimonial" evidence may never be seized and used in 
9 Citing to Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757 (1966) , the 
Warden v. Hayden opinion, 387 U. S. , at 302-303, reserved tha 
question "whether there are items of evidential value whose very 
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evidence is inconsistent with Katz v. United States, 
supra ; Osborn v. United States, supra ; and Berger v. 
New York, supra, approving the seizure under appro-
priate circumstances of conversations of a person sus-
pected of crime. 
It is also clear that the Fifth Amendment does not 
independently proscribe the compelled production of 
every sort of incriminating evidence but applies only 
when the accused is com2elk d t<2.,_ make a testimonial 
communTcation that is incriminating. We have, accord-
ingly, ctec1ined to extend the protection of the privilege 
to the giving of blood samples, Schmerber, supra, at 763-
764; 10 to the giving of handwriting exemplars, Gilbert v. 
California, 388 U. S. 263, 265- 267 (1967); voice exem-
plars, United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 263, 265-267 
( 1967), or the donning of a blouse worn by the perpe-
trator, Holt v. United States, 218 U. S. 245 (19'10) . 
Furthermore, despite Boyd, neither a partnership nor 
the individual partners are shielded from compelled pro-
duction of partnership records on self-incrimination 
grounds. Bellis v. United States, 417 U. S. 85 ( 1974) .. 
It would appeai- that under that case the precise claim 
sustained in Boyd would now be r,ejected for reasons not 
there considered. 
The pronouncement in B oyd that a person may not 
be forced to produce his private papers has nonetheless 
often appeared as dictum in later opinions of this Court. 
See, e. g. , Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S. 361 , 377 
(1911 ); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U. S. 478, 489 
(1913); United States v. White, 322 U. S. 694, 698-69g 
10 The Court 's holding was: "Since the blood test evidence, al-
though an incriminating product of compulsion, was neither peti-
t ioner 's testimony nor evidence relating to some communicative act 
or writing by petitioner, it was_ not inadmissible on privilege 
grounds." 384 U. S., at 765, 
-
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(1944); Davis v. United States, 328 U. S. 582 587-588 
(1946); Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 763-764 
(1966); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322,330 (1973); 
Bellis v. United States, 417 U. S. 85, 87 (1974). To the 
extent, however, that the rule against compelling pro-
duction of private papers rested on the proposition that 
seizures of or subpoenas for "mere evidence," including 
documents, violated the Fourth Amendment and there-
fore also transgressed the Fifth, Gouled v. United States, 
supra, the foundations for the rule have been washed 
away. In consequence, the prohibition against forcing 
the production of private papers has long been a rule 
searching for a rationale consistent with the proscrip-
tions of the Fifth Amendment against compelling a 
person to give "testimony" that incriminates him. 
Accordingly, we turn to the question of what, if any, 
incriminating testimony within the Fifth Amendment's: 
protection, is compelled by a documentary summons. 
I 
A subpoena served on a taxpayer requiring him to pro-
duce an accountant's work papers in his possession with-
out doubt involves SJJ,,bsta11,tial com12ulsion. But it does 
not compel oral testimony; nor would it ordi;;rily ~ -
pel the taxpayer to restate, repeat or affirm the truth 
of the contents of the documents sought. Therefore, 
the Fifth Amendment would not be violated by the fact, 
alone that the papers on their face might incriminate 
the taxpayer, for the privilege protects a person only ~ 
against being incriminated by his own compelled testi-
monial communications. Schmerber v. California, supra; 
Wade v. United States, supra ; and Gilbert v. California,. 
supra. The accountants' work papers are not the tax-
payer's. "'J.hey were not preparedoyiirm, and they ~ n-
t~ o testimonial declarations by him. Furthermore,. 
as far as this record demonstrates, the preparation of all \ 
qf the papers sought in these cases was wholly voluntary,. 
-
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and they cannot be said to contain compelled testimonial 
evidence, either of the taxpayer or of anyone else:1'1 The 
taxpayer cannot avoid compliance with the subpoena 
merely by asserting that the item of evidence which he 
is required to produce contains incriminating writing, 
whether his own or that of someone else. 
The act of producing evidence in response to a subpoena 
nevertheless has communicative aspects of its own, 
wholly aside from the contents of the papers produced. 
Compliance with the subpoena tacitly concedes the exist-
ence of the papers demanded and their possession or con-
trol by the taxpayer. It also would indicate the taxpay-
er's belief that the papers are those described in the 
subpoena. Curcio v. United States, 354 U. S. 118, 125 
(1975). The elements of compulsion are clearly present, 
but the more difficult issues are whether the tacit aver-
ments of the taxpayer are both "testimonial" and "in-
criminating" for purposes of applying the Fifth Amend-
ment. These questions perhaps do not lend themselves 
to categorical answer; their resolution may instead de-
pend on the facts and circumstances of particular cases 
or classes thereof. In light of the records now before 
11 The fact that the documents may have been written by the 
person asserting the privilege is insufficient to trigger the privilege, 
Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361,378 (1911). And, unless the 
Government has compelled the subpoenaed person to write the 
document, cf. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U. S. 39 (1968); 
Grosso v. United States, 390 U. S. 62 (1968), the fact that it was 
written by him is not controlling with respect to the Fifth Amend-
ment issue. Conversations may be seized and introduced in evidence 
under proper safeguards, United States v. Katz, supra; United 
States v. Osborn, supra; Berger v. New York , supra; United States 
v. Bennett, supra, at 897 n. 9, if not compelled. In the case of a 
documentary subpoena the only thing compelled is the act of pro-
ducing the document and the compelled act is the same as the one 
performed when a chattel or document not authored by the pro-
du.cer is denumded. McCormick, supra, at 269. 
-
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us, we are confident that however incriminating the ( 
contents of the accountant's work papers might be, the 
act of producing them-the only thing which the tax-
payer is compelled to do-would not itself involve testi-
monial self-incrimination. 
It is doubtful that im licitl admittin e xistence 
and possession o_ t e_papers xises. t.o the )eve) a£ teiti-
mony within the _J)rotecti@ of the Fifth Amend_!Jlent. 
The papers belong to the accountant, were prepared by 
him and are the kind usually prepared by an accountant 
working on the tax returns of his client. Surely the 
Government is in no way relying on the "truth telling" 
of the taxpayer to prove his access to the documents. 8 
Wigmore, Evidence, supra, § 2264, at 380. The existence 
and location of the papers are a foregone conclusion and 
the taxpayer adds little or nothing to the sum total of 
the government's information by conceding that he in 
fact has the papers. Under these circumstances by en-
forcement of the summons "no constitutional rights are 
touched. The question is not of testimony but of sur-
render." Matter of Harris, 221 U. S. 274, 279· (1911) . 
When an accused is required to submit a handwriting 
exemplar he admits his ability to write and impliedly 
asserts that the exemplar is his writing. But in common 
experience, the first would be a near truism and the latter 
self-evident. In any event, although the exemplar may 
be incriminating to the accused and although he is com-
pelled to furnish it, his Fifth Amendment privilege is 
not violated because nothing · he has said or done is 
deemed to be sufficiently testimonial for purposes of the 
privilege. This Court has also time and again allowed 
subpoenas against the custodian of corporate documents 
o[:"those belonging to other collective entities such as 
unions and partnerships and those of bankrupt businesse_;:s 
over claims that the documents w1ff mcriminate the 
-
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custodian despite the fact that producing the documents 
tacitly admits their existence and their location in the 
hands of their possessor. E. g., Wilson v. United States, 
221 U. S. 361 (1911); Dreier v. United States, 221 U. S. 
394 (1911); United States v. White, 322 U. S. 694 
(1944); Bellis v. United States, 417 U. S. 85 (19'74); 
Matter of Harris, 221 U. S. 274 (1911). The existence 
and possession or control of the subpoenaed documents 
being no more in issue here than in the above cases, the 
summons is equally enforceable. 
Moreover, assuming that these aspects of producing 
the accountants' papers have some minimal testimonial 
significance, surely it is not illegal to seek accounting 
help in connection with one's tax returns or for the 
accountant to prepare work papers and deliver them to 
the taxpayer. At this juncture, we are quite unpre- \ 
pared to hold that either the fact of existence of the 
papers or of their possession by the taxpayer poses any 
realistic threat of incrimination to the taxpayer. 
As for the possibility that responding to the subpoena 
would authenticate 12 the work papers, production would 
12 The "implicit authentication" rationale appears to be the pre-
vailing justification for the Fifth Amendment's application to 
documentary subpoenas. Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757,. 
763-764 (1966) (" .. . [T]he privilege reaches . . . the compulsion 
of responses which are also communications, for example, compli-
ance with a subpoena to produce one's papers. Boyd v. United 
States, 116 U. S. 616"; Couch v. United States, 409 U. S. 322, 344, 
346-348 (1973) (dissenting opinion of MARSHALL, J.) (the person 
complying with the subpoena "implicitly testifies that the evidence 
he brings forth is in fact the evidence demanded.") ; United States 
v. Beattie, Docket No. 75-6041 (CA2 Aug. 18, 1975) per Friendly, 
J. ("a subpoena demanding that an accused produce his own records · 
is . . . the equivalent of requiring him to take the stand and admit 
their genuineness") ; 8 Wigmore, Evidence, supra, at 380 (the testi-
monial component involved in compliance with an order for produc-
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express nothing more than the taxpayer's belief that the 
papers are those described in the subpoena. The tax-
payers would be no more competent to authenticate 
their accountant's work papers or reports by producing 
them than they would be to authenticate them if testi-
fying orally. They did not prepare the papers and 
could not vouch for their accuracy. The documents 
would not be admissible in evidence against the tax-
payers without authenticating testimony. Without 
more, responding to the subpoena in the circumstances 
before us would not appear to represent a substantial 
threat of self-incrimination. Moreover,~son v. United 
States, supra; Dreier v. United States, supra; United 
States v. White, supra; Bellis v. United States, supra; 
and Matter of Harris, supra, the custodian of£ corporate, 
union or partnership books or those of a bankrupt busi-
ness was ordered to respond to a subpoena for the busi-
ness' books even though doing so involved a "representa-
tion that the documents produced are those demanded 
by the subpoena," Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 
125 (1957).13 
as an incident of the process) that the articles produced are the 
ones demanded) "; McCormick, Evidence, supra, § 126, p. 268 ("This 
rule [applying the Fifth Amendment privilege to documentary sub-
poenas] is defended on the theory that one who produces documents; 
( or other matter) described in the subpoena duces tecum represents, 
by his production, that the documents produced are in fact the 
documents described in the subpoena."); People v. D efor e, 242 N. Y. 
13, 27, per Cardoza, J. ("A defendant is 'protected from producing 
his documents in response to a subpoena duces tecum, for his pro-
duction of them in court would be his voucher of their genuineness.' 
There would then be testimonial compulsion"). 
13 In these cases compliance with the subpoena is required even 
though the books have been kept by the person subpoenaed and 
his producing them would itself be sufficient au.thentication to permit. 
~h~ir introduction against him. 
.. -
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Whether the Fifth Amendment would shield the tax-
payer from producing his own tax records in his posses-
sion is a question not involved here; for the papers 
demanded here are not his "private papers," see Boyd v. 
United States, supra, at -. We do hold that com- 1 
pliance with a summons directing the taxpayer to pro-
duce the accountant's documents involved in this case 
would involve no incriminating testimony within the 
protection of the Fifth Amendment. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit in No. 74-611 is reversed. The judgment of the 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in No. 74-18 is 
affirmed. 
So ordered. 
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